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Abstract
The European Union (EU) has moved towards bicameralism, making the codecision
procedure  its most important mechanism for decision making. To gauge if European
Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) are equally powerful ‘codecision makers’,
understanding of the final stage of the procedure – bargaining in the Conciliation Committee –
is crucial. Here, EP and CM are assumed to have spatial preferences determined by their
respective internal decision mechanisms. Applying bargaining theory to predict inter-
institutional agreements in the Conciliation Committee, it turns out that although
institutionally the Council and the Parliament are seemingly in a symmetric position, CM has
significantly greater influence on EU legislation.
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 1 Introduction
Bargaining between European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) in the
Conciliation Committee represents the ﬁnal chance to implement a change to the status quo
under the European Union’s codecision procedure. The bargaining outcome that EP, CM,
and also the European Commission (EC)1 expect to result from invoking the Conciliation
Committee plays a crucial role at earlier stages of the procedure. Using backward induction
it can be concluded that it is indeed the determinant of any codecision agreement if EP,
CM, and EC act strategically.
Analysis of the Conciliation Committee and the distribution of power in it is therefore
precondition for analysis of the codecision procedure as such. Consequently, several authors
have devoted their attention to the Conciliation Committee including Steunenberg and
Dimitrova (1999), Crombez (1997, 2000), Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), and Steunenberg
and Selck (2002). Their mostly qualitative assessments of who shapes the compromises
reached by EP and CM – and hence the distribution of power between these two players –
diverge.
Crombez regards EP as the agenda setter in the Conciliation Committee but concludes
nevertheless that both EP and CM “genuinely codecide which policy to implement” (1997,
p. 113). His analysis does not discriminate much between the Maastricht and Amsterdam
versions of codecision,2 which according to Steunenberg and Selck (2002), however, has no
signiﬁcant consequences (based on the methodology of Steuenberg et al., 1999). Tsebelis
and Garrett (2000) focus on the Amsterdam version and argue that the EU has moved
towards bicameralism. Inspired by formal bargaining models, they ﬁnd no reason to suggest
that either CM or EP is favored by the procedure, so that both can be expected to have
the same inﬂuence.
In contrast, Steunenberg and Dimitrova (1999) observe an advantage to CM, in par-
ticular the member country holding its presidency, in a model that assumes the Council
president to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to EP. The latter assumption builds an asym-
metry into the model – making greater power for CM a non-surprising consequence – which
is controversial not only because of the commitment problems associated with such oﬀers.
However, we ﬁnd that Steunenberg and Dimitrova’s conclusion of a signiﬁcant advan-
tage for CM remains valid also for symmetric bicameral bargaining, as assumed by Garrett
and Tsebelis. Key to this conclusion is the assumption that the representatives of the two
chambers have preferences deﬁned by aggregating unidimensional single-peaked preferences
of individual members of EP and CM using the institutions’ respective voting rules. Intra-
institutional majority rules are an important factor in inter-institutional bargaining, which
1The Commission only acts as a facilitator in the Conciliation Committee but is an essential player in
the preceding stages of the decision process – in particular, it initiates the codecision procedure.
2The original version of codecision, laid out in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, was revised by the
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 speciﬁcally to make the procedure more symmetric, see e.g. the comments
by Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), Tsebelis and Money (1997), Crombez (2000), Crombez et al. (2000),
and Garrett et al. (2001). Steunenberg (1994, 2000), Garrett (1995), and Crombez (1997) analyze the
pre-Amsterdam version.
1the literature has largely neglected.
This paper aims at a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the bargaining process in
the Conciliation Committee. It assumes strategic players with spatial preferences charac-
terized by individual ideal points in a Euclidian policy space, and carries out a step-by-step
analysis of the two canonical models of bilateral bargaining – cooperative Nash bargaining
and noncooperative Rubinstein bargaining – with variations. We do not argue that either
Nash or Rubinstein bargaining is the most appropriate model to explain or predict agree-
ments in the EU’s Conciliation Committee. Still, the increasing relevance of codecision
and the central strategic role of bargaining between EP and CM in it in our view war-
rant a detailed consideration of the non-obvious implications of these standard bargaining
models.3
Our ﬁrst – only at ﬁrst sight counter-intuitive – observation is that compromises reached
by EP and CM will typically not be close to or even exactly in the middle of both decision
bodies’ ideal policy points. Instead, there is a very robust bias of the bargaining outcome
in favor of the player with smaller distance between its ideal point and the status quo,
i.e. an important status quo bias. For illustration, suppose that utility of EP’s and CM’s
respective representatives decreases linearly in the distance between each player’s uni-
dimensional ideal point and status quo. Then, the symmetric Nash bargaining solution
predicts an agreement exactly on the ideal point of the player with smaller distance to status
quo if there exists any mutually beneﬁcial policy change at all. Predictions are less extreme
for strictly concave utility and Rubinstein bargaining with non-negligible impatience, but
signiﬁcant status quo bias persists.
Status quo bias is compatible with symmetric power or average inﬂuence on the bar-
gaining outcome only if EP and CM are equally likely to be the more enthusiastic one
about changing the status quo. A priori, i.e. assuming identical preference distributions
for the members of EP and CM, this is not the case: It is shown that CM’s qualiﬁed
majority requirement makes the distribution of its collective ideal point – corresponding to
the distribution of the ideal point of its pivotal member – pronouncedly skewed in contrast
to an almost symmetric distribution implied by EP’s simple majority rule. This implies
that CM is far more often the player closer to the status quo and, by bargaining’s status
quo bias, to deﬁne the compromise reached in the Conciliation Committee. Measuring
a player’s power as the sensitivity of the collective decision to its preferences (see Napel
and Widgr´ en, 2002), CM’s a priori power turns out to exceed that of EP by an order of
magnitude.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the representa-
tion of preferences of EP and CM members in a bargaining context. Assuming that spatial
preferences with von Neumann-Morgenstern representations exist also for EP and CM in
aggregate, Section 3 concerns the cooperative Nash bargaining solution, explicitly deriving
the Nash bargain agreed upon by EP and CM in case of linear utility (risk neutrality). The
key ﬁnding of this example is pronounced bias towards the ideal point which is closer to
3For a game-theoretic investigation of the codecision procedure as such, in which the Conciliation
Committee is but the ﬁnal stage, see Napel and Widgr´ en (2003).
2the status quo. This is generalized to arbitrary single-peaked spatial preferences. Section 4
analyzes noncooperative models of alternating oﬀers bargaining, ﬁrst looking at ones with
an exogenously ﬁxed number of stages and then Rubinstein’s inﬁnite horizon model. These
models conﬁrm earlier conclusions. Section 5 comments on bargaining models which as-
sume only boundedly rational agents. Section 6 then deals with the implications of status
quo bias for inter-institutional power and average inﬂuence of EP and CM on European
Union policies. Section 7 summarizes our conclusions and discusses possible extensions of
the analysis.
2 Spatial Preferences
It is common in models of political decision-making to assume that the preferences of
political actors are single-peaked and can be characterized by a bliss point or ideal point
in a multi-dimensional space X µ Rn together with a metric d on X such that the further
an agent’s ideal point ¸ is away from a policy x 2 X, the less satisﬁed he or she is by
x.4 Such preferences can be represented by any utility function u which is decreasing in
distance d(¸;x) between ¸ and x, where d can be standard Euclidian distance or any other
metric. Any utility function ˜ u that results from a strictly increasing transformation of u
represents the considered player’s preferences just as well (see Fig. 1 for an illustration
with unidimensional X). In other words: standard spatial preferences are ordinal and
nothing can be said either about how much a player i with ideal point ¸i suﬀers from
policy x compared to a player j with ideal point ¸j nor, which is crucial in the context of
bargaining, which probability of having ideal point ¸i implemented instead of some point y
would make player i prefer this ‘gamble’ or lottery to the safe alternative x.
So, more information about preferences than in a simple median voting world is needed
when political actors are considered to bargain. Bargaining agents face the risk of failing
to reach an agreement if they do not give in to their opponent’s most preferred alternative
right away. Moreover, bargaining is usually conducted in a time and resource-consuming
manner. Having policy x implemented today must therefore be compared, for example,
with experiencing the status quo q 2 X for another bargaining period and then imple-
menting policy y. Meaningful models of bargaining require a speciﬁcation of either agents’
risk preference or time preference or both.












4The assumption that smaller distance is always better is very restrictive. It implies that utility must
be symmetric in ¸-x space, i.e. players have concentric indiﬀerence curves and do care about the distance
between ¸ and x, but not about the latter’s position.
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Figure 1: Alternative utility representation of spatial preferences with ideal point ¸
is possible also in the context of bargaining. However, above functions u and ˜ u are no
longer equivalent when interpreted as cardinal utility functions used to evaluate risky
choices by taking expectations (von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility) or to which a
time discount factor ± 2 (0;1) can be applied, i.e. using U(¸;x;t) = ±
t ¢u(¸;x) in order to
compare possible agreements at diﬀerent points in time. This has to be remembered when
spatial preferences are used in a bargaining context.
3 Nash Bargaining with Spatial Preferences
A grossly simplifying assumption in the analysis of negotiations between European Par-
liament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) is that – at least during their dealings
in the Conciliation Committee – both are unitary actors with determinate ideal points.
This assumes that there are real or virtual representatives of both EP and CM who possess
spatial preferences just like individual members of both institutions are assumed to do (see
Section 2). The ideal points of these representatives, denoted by ¼ for the Parliament and
¹ for Ministers in the following, are naturally given by the ideal points of the respective
institution’s median or pivotal members on a particular issue, i.e. for a unidimensional
policy space X µ R. For higher dimensions, the assumption of a well-deﬁned collective
preference is – despite the strong restrictions imposed on individual preferences – not in-
nocuous at all. For the sake of simplicity, it will nevertheless be made.5 Until Section 6,
5See Bade (2002) for an innovative analysis of multidimensional electoral competition. Under the
assumption that two competing parties select their platform under uncertainty (rather than only risk) about
voters’ preferences, she proves existence of an equilibrium for many multidimensional cases. Moreover,
each party announces the respective median position in each separate dimension in equilibrium. This may









Figure 2: Contract curve C in case of a two-dimensional policy space
EP’s and CM’s ideal points ¼ and ¹ are assumed to be exogenously given.
Rational players will seek to agree on some Pareto-eﬃcient policy outcome ˆ x 2 X,
corresponding to utility levels (ˆ u¼; ˆ u¹) for EP and CM, respectively, none of which can
be raised without lowering the other one. The subset of Pareto-eﬃcient policies which
are considered as least as good as the status quo by both players is the contract curve
introduced by Edgeworth (1881). For spatial preferences, the contract curve is the segment
of the line connecting ¼ and ¹ which lies within the intersection of the two balls (lines or
discs for n = 1;2) with centers ¼ and ¹ and radii d(¼;q) and d(¹;q), respectively, where
q 2 X refers to the status quo (see Fig. 2). Bilateral bargaining over multidimensional
policy issues under complete information therefore amounts to unidimensional bargaining.
The contract curve C is non-empty, i.e. there are ‘gains from trade’ between EP and CM,
unless the line connecting ¼ and ¹ passes through q, i.e. unless EP and CM have exactly
opposite positions.
Nash (1950) studied the bargaining problem in a still more abstract way. In partic-
ular, his analysis did neither presuppose nor take into account any particular context of
bargaining such as bilateral trade or agreement on some policy. Rather, he identiﬁed a
bargain entirely by looking at players’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utility levels, i.e. their
(commonly known) subjective evaluations of the underlying bargaining situation. Any
point x in policy space X can be mapped to the particular utility pair (u¼(x);u¹(x)) that
reﬂects players’ preferences for it. This deﬁnes the bargaining set U of all feasible utility
combinations. Utility pair uq = (uq
¼; ¯ uq
¹) ´ (u¼(q);u¹(q)) summarizes players’ evaluation
of the status quo situation and has an important eﬀect on negotiations.
Nash took U and uq 2 U as a suﬃcient description of any bilateral bargaining situation,
assuming two perfectly rational players that cannot fool or trick each other. He searched for
5a mapping F from arbitrary bargaining problems hU;uqi6 to a unique element F(U;uq) 2 U
which satisﬁes “several properties that it would seem natural for the solution to have” (Nash
1953, p. 129). It can be deduced from these properties that the Nash bargain u¤ agreed on




¼) ¢ (u¹ ¡ u
q
¹): (1)
The Nash bargain u¤ maximizes the product of both players’ utility gains relative to the
status quo. Graphically, one looks at the family of hyperbolas deﬁned by all pairs (u¼;u¹)
which result in a given product k of utility gains. The tangency point of the subset of
Pareto-eﬃcient and individually rational7 elements of U and the highest hyperbola still
having a point in common with this set deﬁnes u¤.
The Nash solution has been generalized by Kalai (1977) to reﬂect asymmetries between
players that are not already covered by any asymmetry of U. The asymmetric Nash
bargain with bargaining powers ® ¸ 0 and ¯ = 1 ¡ ® ¸ 0 for EP and CM, respectively, is









An asymmetry in bargaining powers can, for example, arise from diﬀerences in players’
patience (see Section 4).
Consider the simple case of a unidimensional policy space X = [0;1] and the risk-neutral
utility functions
u¼(x) ´ u(¼;x) = ¡j¼ ¡ xj (3)
and
u¹(x) ´ u(¹;x) = ¡j¹ ¡ xj (4)
for ¼;¹ 2 X. Suppose without loss of generality that ¼ < ¹ and take the status quo to be
q = 0, i.e. let there be gains from trade. Then, uq = (¡¼;¡¹) is players’ status quo utility.
Agreement on x = ¼ results in the utility pair (0;¼ ¡ ¹), agreement on x = ¹ results
in (¼ ¡ ¹;0) (see Fig. 3). Mapping any possible agreement x 2 X to the corresponding
utility levels for both players yields the set U depicted in Fig. 4.8 The Nash bargain u¤
does, as indicated in Fig. 4, correspond to agreement on x = ¼, i.e. the ideal point of the
player closer to the status quo, EP. Algebraically, restricting attention to Pareto-eﬃcient
agreements x 2 [¼;¹] judged better by both players than the status quo, one maximizes9
f(u¼;u¹) = (u¼ ¡ (¡¼))(u¹ ¡ (¡¹)) (5)
6Technical conditions on hU;uqi like convexity and compactness are usually imposed in order to guar-
antee existence and uniqueness of the solution.
7Individual rationality combined with the voluntary character of any bilateral agreement imply u¤ = uq.
8The bargaining set U0 = f(u¼;u¹) 2 R2
¡: u¼+u¹ · ¼¡¹g can be obtained from U by adding irrelevant
alternatives. It satisﬁes the technical assumptions typically used by the Nash bargaining solution (it is
convex, closed, and bounded from above).
9For ease of exposition, we do not distinguish between utility functions ui and particular components
of elements of U, i.e. a utility level for player i, in our notation. Whether u¼ refers to the utility function







Figure 3: A unidimensional policy space and risk-neutrality





d[(u¼ + ¼)(¼ ¡ ¹ ¡ u¼ + ¹)]
du¼
= ¡2u¼;
i.e. the Nash product f increases for u¼ · 0 and is maximal for u¼ = 0. This implies
u¤ = (0;¼ ¡ ¹) and agreement on x¤ = ¼. The party less eager to replace the status quo,
in our example EP, gets exactly its ideal policy; the other one, here CM, has to be satisﬁed
with at least some improvement of the situation.10 Hence, intuitively appealing assertions
of EP and CM ‘meeting in the middle’ between their ideal policies – based on a superﬁcial
symmetry between the two players – are too quick.
If EP’s and CM’s utility is not linear in distance to the respective ideal point but strictly
concave (corresponding to risk aversion or decreasing marginal returns from moving closer
to the considered player’s ideal point, e.g. ˜ u(¸;x) = ¡(¸ ¡ x)2), then the Pareto frontier
connecting the two extreme utility levels u ´ (0; ˜ u(¹;¼)) and u ´ (˜ u(¼;¹);0) becomes
strictly concave as well. Keeping the symmetry between EP and CM (they have the
same utility function u(¸i;x), just diﬀerent ideal points), this implies that the hyperbola
corresponding to the highest attainable level of the product of both players’ utility gains
touches U’s Pareto frontier P(U) no longer at its right endpoint, u, but somewhere between
it and the middle of the curve.11
Suppose that EP and CM try to reach an agreement in a more than unidimensional
10Both players enjoy equal net utility gains in this linear case. If utility is assumed to be interpersonally
comparable, this means both beneﬁt (relative to status quo) equally from the agreement.
11It cannot be to the left of the Pareto curve’s midpoint, which would correspond to an agreement x
















Figure 4: Bargaining set U and Nash bargain u¤
policy space, e.g. the 2-dimensional space shown in Fig. 2. If utility is linearly decreasing
in distance, it will decrease (increase) linearly for EP (CM) as one moves from any point on
the contract curve C to another one closer to ¹. The opposite applies for a move towards
¼. Adding constants to players’ utility levels or multiplying them by any positive number
does not aﬀect the Nash bargain because it results in equivalent utility representations.12
For example, the utility representations can be chosen such that u = (0;¡d(¹;0)) and
u = (¡d(¼;0);0), respectively, are players’ utility levels in the northwestern and south-
eastern endpoints of contract curve C. Then, EP and CM – according to Nash’s bargaining
solution – will agree on the policy x associated with utility levels (0;¡d(¹;0)). For the
conﬁguration shown in Fig. 2 this does not, in contrast to the unidimensional case inves-
tigated above, actually correspond to EP’s ideal point because the latter would be worse
to CM than the status quo. Outcome x¤ is the Pareto-eﬃcient policy which is the most
beneﬁcial to EP among all policies that give CM at least as much utility as the status
quo, i.e. satisfy individual rationality. For d(¼;0) < d(¹;0), CM beneﬁts only weakly from
reaching an agreement – its greater dislike of the status quo deprives it from achieving a
strict utility increase over the status quo.
The argument concerning the case of concave utility given for the unidimensional case
applies also to higher dimensions: As players become (symmetrically) more risk averse, the
agreement will slowly improve for the player with greater dislike of the status quo, but still
remain biased to his counterpart’s favor. Focussing on cases with a diﬀerentiable Pareto
12Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation of preferences u is equivalent to any repre-
sentation ˜ u if one results from the other by applying an aﬃne transformation, i.e. ˜ u = ½+!¢u for ½;! 2 R
and ! > 0.
8frontier, this can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 Assume that preferences of EP and CM are represented by utility functions
ui(x) ´ u(d(¸i;x)) which are strictly decreasing and weakly concave in d(¸i;x) and yield
a Pareto frontier described by a function Á: u¼(x) 7! maxfu¹(y): y 2 X ^ u¼(y) = u¼(x)g
which is diﬀerentiable on the interior of the contract curve. Then the symmetric Nash
bargain x¤(¼;¹) ´ x¤ is closer to the ideal point which is closer to the status quo, i.e.
d(¼;0) < d(¹;0) () d(¼;x
¤) < d(¹;x
¤);
whenever there are gains from trade.
The proof is provided in the appendix.
In case of convex utility, i.e. if players are risk-loving or experience increasing marginal
utility the closer x gets to their ideal point, the Nash bargain in general is no longer
well-deﬁned. However, for the special case of spatial preferences considered in this paper,
the individually rational and Pareto-eﬃcient policy x¤ most beneﬁcial to the player with
smallest status quo distance remains the unique prediction.13
Status quo bias is robust to the introduction of moderately asymmetric bargaining
powers ® and ¯ = 1 ¡ ® in the Nash bargaining solution. For the one-dimensional linear
case studied above, the asymmetric Nash solution is the maximizer of
f(u¼;u¹) = (u¼ + ¼)
® ¢ (u¹ + ¹)
1¡®
constrained by (u¼;u¹) = uq and u¼ + u¹ = ¼ ¡ ¹. One can equivalently calculate the




u¼ ¡ 2®¼ + ¼
u2
¼ ¡ ¼2 = 0
or
u¼ = ¼(2® ¡ 1)
together with (u¼;u¹) > uq as necessary conditions for an interior solution. Assuming
¼ < ¹, the critical level of EP’s bargaining power ®c below which the asymmetric Nash







This is always smaller than 1/2 (considering the case of ¼ · ¹) and may even be negative.
Only a suﬃciently pronounced asymmetry in bargaining powers can overcome status quo
bias.
13See e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, pp. 16ﬀ) or Harsanyi (1956) for justiﬁcations of the solution
u¤ to (1), which corresponds to x¤, as the expected bargaining result that do not rely on Nash’s original































(x;t) : agreement on (x,1-x) in period t
(0;¥): disagreement outcome
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Figure 5: Ultimatum game form, 2-stage and n-stage alternating oﬀers bargaining game forms
4 Alternating Oﬀers Bargaining
The Nash solution investigated above – like other solution concepts in cooperative game
theory14 – identify particularly ‘reasonable’ (as formalized by axioms) binding agreements
between two bargainers without specifying an actual process of negotiation. Non-cooperative
models of bargaining, in contrast, consider bargaining as a fully speciﬁed game; any agree-
ments prior to playing the game are assumed to be non-binding and are hence ignored.
Again, consider the unidimensional policy space X = [0;1], ideal points ¼ and ¹ for EP
and CM where without loss of generality ¼ · ¹, and status quo q = 0 (see Fig. 3).15 Then,
the set of Pareto-optimal policies which satisfy individual rationality is ˜ X = [¼;minf¹;2¼g]
because any x > 2¼ would be worse to EP than the status quo while any x < ¼ or x > ¹
could be improved upon to the beneﬁt of both EP and CM. We will write ¹0 ´ minf¹;2¼g
in the following and restrict proposals to ˜ X.
One of the simplest non-cooperative models of bilateral bargaining is the ultimatum
game illustrated in Fig. 5(a). It supposes that CM moves ﬁrst and makes a proposal
x0 2 [¼;¹0] and that EP can only respond to the proposal by either rejecting or accepting
it. This corresponds to a take-it-or-leave-it agenda setting game. For simplicity, let both
players’ utility functions be linear as in (3) and (4). A very clear prediction is obtained
for this simple bargaining protocol. Namely, the ultimatum game has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE). Any strategy of EP which prescribes rejection in case of a
14See e.g. the axiomatic approach to bargaining between groups proposed by Chae and Heidhues (2002).
15q 2 (0;¼) and q 2 (¹;1] would lead to qualitatively identical conclusions, where in the latter case CM
is the player with smaller status quo distance. For q 2 (¼;¹) there is no mutually beneﬁcial policy change
and hence x¤ ´ q.
10proposal x0 2 [¼;¹0) would constitute an incredible threat; namely, it is suboptimal for EP
to reject a utility improvement of ∆ = ¡(x0¡¼)¡(¡¼) = 2¼¡x0 > 0 relative to the status
quo. The SPE concept rules this out. The only candidates for EP’s strategy in a SPE are
therefore the strategy s0
2 which accepts any oﬀer x0 2 [¼;2¼] but rejects x0 = ¹0 = 2¼ in
case of ¹ ¸ 2¼, and the strategy s¤
2 which accepts any oﬀer x0 2 [¼;¹0].16 The strategy
proﬁle (¹0;s¤
2) is a SPE – specifying that CM asks for its maximal feasible gains from trade
(either implementing its ideal point or the point closest to it that is no worse to EP than
the status quo), and EP accepts.17 The proﬁle (¹0;s0
2) is no SPE since it is sub-optimal
for CM to propose s1 = ¹0 in case of ¹0 = 2¼ (which is rejected by s0
2) anticipating that
any proposal s1 < 2¼ would be accepted by EP. Since, however, no such proposal s1 is
optimal – max[¼;¹0) does not exist – (¹0;s¤
2) is the unique SPE of the ultimatum game
and x¤ = ¹0 is its outcome in policy terms.
This SPE prediction reﬂects overwhelming bargaining power of CM as the proposer in
the ultimatum game. Similarly, if EP were the proposer and CM the responder, x¤ = ¼
would be the very asymmetric outcome.18 Ultimatum bargaining has been proposed as a
model for decision-making in the Conciliation Committee by Steunenberg and Dimitrova
(1999). They argue that, although oﬃcially the Committee is co-chaired by CM’s presiding
member and EP’s Vice-President, the former exerts agenda setting power due to its more
important role at the preparatory stage before the committee meets. Crombez (2000),
in contrast, assumes that the EP takes the lead and makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal
to CM. No matter which of these contradicting assertions about who moves ﬁrst is a
better model of reality, ultimatum bargaining rests on more than agenda setting. The SPE
prediction is driven by the ﬁrst mover’s opportunity to credibly make a take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀer or, equivalently, to irrevocably commit to its initial proposal. In our view, this
is unrealistic assumption for the Conciliation Committee. Hence, ultimatum bargaining
should be regarded as, at best, a coarse ﬁrst approximation.
SPE predictions already change signiﬁcantly if, a little more realistically, the game has
two stages as in Fig. 5(b). Suppose that after having rejected an oﬀer x0, EP can make
a counter-oﬀer x1. The overall surplus division will then reﬂect EP’s advantage of making
a credible take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at stage 2 (referred to as period t = 1), while possible
renegotiation in stage 2 renders any proclaimed commitment to a particular division by
CM in stage 1 incredible.
Yet more realistically, one can consider the alternating oﬀers bargaining game with n
stages illustrated in ﬁgure 5(c). Let players’ preferences over outcomes (x;t), specifying
16Considering oﬀers from the entire interval [0;1] instead of only those from [¼;¹0] does not aﬀect results.
In the former case, s¤
2 would prescribe acceptance of any x 2 [0;2¼] for EP, but CM prefers not to propose
any x < ¼ or, in fact, x < ¹0.
17Acceptance by EP is only a weak best response for ¹0 = 2¼. This Nash equilibrium is therefore not
strict.
18The issue of responder’s individual rationality does not arise if X is unidimensional and the player
closer to the status quo proposes.
11the agreed policy and the time of agreement, be of the particularly simple type
U¼(x;t) = U(¼;x;t) = ±
t
¼ ¢ u(¼;x)
U¹(x;t) = U(¹;x;t) = ±
t
¹ ¢ u(¹;x) (6)
for discount factors ±i 2 (0;1), which reﬂect players’ patience, and function
u(¸i;x) = ¸i ¡ j¸i ¡ xj; (7)
which represents players’ spatial preferences in any ﬁxed period t. Utility functions U¼
and U¹ formalize indiﬀerence between an eventual failure of negotiations (no agreement
reached in the ﬁnal period and thus the status quo prevails) and any earlier conﬁrmation
of the status quo (agreement on status quo policy q = 0 in period t < n ¡ 1) because
U(¸;0;t) = 0 for any t = 0;:::;n¡1. The same would be true – and the following results
would be unchanged – if u is multiplied by any constant ! > 0; thus, players’ utility levels
in their respective ideal points e.g. could be chosen to both equal 1.
Consider ﬁrst n = 2, the two-stage game depicted in Fig. 5(b). With preference
speciﬁcation (6), EP would anticipate to achieve x¤
1 = ¼ in period t = 1 if it rejects CM’s
proposal x0. Knowing that x¤
1 would result in utility level U¼(¼;1) = ±¼¼ for EP, CM
optimally chooses its proposal x0 such that EP weakly prefers accepting it to outcome
(x;t) = (¼;1), i.e.
U¼(x¤
0;0) = ¼ ¡ (x¤
0 ¡ ¼)
! = ±¼¼ = U¼(¼;1)
() x¤
0 = 2¼ ¡ ±¼¼:
CM’s strategy of proposing x¤
0 in t = 0 and accepting any x1 2 [¼;¹0] in t = 1, and EP’s
strategy of accepting oﬀers x0 · x¤
0 in t = 0 and proposing x¤
1 in t = 1 form the unique
SPE of the game.19 Hence in the alternating oﬀers bargaining game with two stages in
which CM proposes ﬁrst, x¤
0 = 2¼ ¡±¼¼ is proposed and immediately accepted. If EP had
the right to propose ﬁrst, the equilibrium outcome would be x¤
0 = ±¹¹0 instead.
Above backward induction argument of players’ correctly anticipating how much they
have to oﬀer in order to make their counterpart at least indiﬀerent between accepting an
oﬀer and rejecting it in favor of playing the continuation game can be applied to alternating
oﬀers bargaining for any given number n of stages. One obtains
Proposition 2 Given ideal points ¼ · ¹ and the ﬁnite set of periods T = f0;:::;n ¡ 1g,
n ¸ 1, the unique SPE outcome of the alternating oﬀers bargaining game with n stages and
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t ¢ ¼ (8)
where byc denotes the biggest integer smaller than or equal to y.
19Recall that strategies are complete plans of action deﬁning what a player does even in situations that
are impossible given the correct implementation of own and others’ speciﬁed choices.
12The proof is given in the appendix. Prop. 2 contains a compact description of the predicted
outcome of bargaining in the Conciliation Committee for a given number of (potential)
bargaining stages n and players who discount future utility.20
A player’s opportunity to make the ﬁnal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer in period t = n¡1 is a
source of bargaining strength. For small n this may over-compensate status quo bias: As
seen above, if n = 1 and CM proposes, the SPE outcome is x = ¹0, i.e. either CM obtains
its ideal point ¹ or x = 2¼ which makes CM the only party to strictly beneﬁt from a status
quo change despite greater distance to it.21
EU deadlines for reaching a decision in the Conciliation Committee combined with the
speciﬁc schedules of its members may deﬁne some ﬁnal period in real negotiations.22 Yet,
it seems arbitrary to use any particular n in the model. A focal benchmark case is therefore
bargaining without any ﬁxed ﬁnal round.
Though absence of a ﬁnal period forbids the backward induction argument for ﬁnite
horizon bargaining underlying (8), there is an even neater solution for an inﬁnite time hori-
zon. Rubinstein’s (1982) main result – concerning much more general types of preferences
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t ¢ (2¼ ¡ ±¼¼ ¡ ¹






















instead (still considering ¼ · ¹ – for ¼ > ¹ the roles of ¹ and ¼ are to be switched).
Assuming identical patience ±¹ = ±¼ = ± 2 (0;1) and considering the limit case of
extreme patience, ± ! 1, both (9) and (10) converge to lim±!1 x¤(±;±) = ¼. So, no matter
20Note the somewhat surprising feature of above SPE that the agreement is inﬂuenced by the ﬁnal period
and who proposes in it, but is already reached in t = 0. This is a consequence of the assumed perfect
rationality of EP and CM and the fact that preferences are considered to be common knowledge.
21If ¼ ¿ ¹, i.e if EP is rather satisﬁed with the status quo while CM is not, the SPE outcome ¹0 is still
very close to EP’s ideal point, ¼, and far from CM’s, ¹.
22The time for the Conciliation Committee is limited to eight weeks – two weeks devoted to preparation
plus six weeks for bargaining. The total period can be extended up to three months. Note that the member
state which is holding presidency can postpone the preparatory stage and hence conciliation.
13whether CM or EP has the initiative in the Conciliation Committee, the bargaining result
amounts to implementation of the ideal point of the player with smaller distance to the
status quo. We observe exactly the same pronounced status quo bias as in the linear utility
version of Nash bargaining.
This is not surprising: Rubinstein’s noncooperative analysis of an explicit, extensive-
form bargaining game and Nash’s cooperative analysis of the implications of “reasonable
properties” are very closely related. This was ﬁrst pointed out by Binmore (1987). Namely,
if the time that passes between each rejection and counter-oﬀer becomes negligibly small,
while the discount factors ±¹ and ±¼ applied to payoﬀs delayed by a ﬁxed time interval
stay constant (so that players become almost indiﬀerent to the period of agreement) the
SPE payoﬀs to CM and EP approach the utility levels of the asymmetric Nash bargaining




and ® = 1 ¡ ¯
for CM and EP of the bargaining problem deﬁned by players’ respective, possibly non-linear
utility of policy x for all x 2 X = [0;1] and status quo q = 0 (cf. Section 3). Rubinstein’s
model of alternating oﬀers bargaining thereby provides a foundation of the asymmetry in
(2) based on perfectly rational strategic interaction with asymmetric patience.
The close relation between the Nash solution and Rubinstein bargaining with discount-
ing implies that the former’s status quo bias established in Prop. 1 is also a feature of the
latter, at least if EP and CM do neither discount future utility too much (so that x¤(±¹;±¼)
is close to its Nash solution limit) nor too asymmetrically (so that ® is still above the criti-
cal level ®c identiﬁed in Sect. 3). This applies to fairly general stage-level utility functions
u(¸i;x) and multidimensional policy spaces as long as one crucial aspect of the preferences
deﬁned by (7) is kept: For any policy x that improves upon the status quo from EP’s and
CM’s perspective, both EP and CM prefer to agree on it rather sooner than later. Hence,
if the stage utility function
u(¸;x) = ¡j¸ ¡ xj;
which was a straightforward choice in Sect. 3 and for the ultimatum game, were used
in intertemporal utility functions (6) instead of u(¸;x) = ¸ ¡ j¸ ¡ xj, one would obtain
neither above SPE outcome x¤(±¹;±¼) nor status quo bias. U(¸;x;t) = ±
t ¢ u(¸;x) in this
case would specify indiﬀerence of both players concerning the time of an agreement on their
respective ideal point (U(¸;¸;t) = 0 for any t ¸ 0). And yet more oddly, an agreement
on anything other than one’s ideal point would be judged better by U, the more distant
in time it is (±
tu(¸;x) < 0 increases in t for x 6= ¸).23 This stresses the point made in
Sect. 2 concerning the importance of appropriately representing spatial preferences in a
bargaining context.
Of course, stationary discounting is just one way to model EP’s and CM’s impatience in
implementing a Pareto-improvement of the status quo.24 An appealing alternative choice
23U captures the ‘suﬀering’ from a non-ideal policy and that a utility loss tomorrow is preferred to one
today. The negative consequences of the status quo are not accounted for.
24The case of non-stationary discounting is considered by Rusinowska (2002).
14is
U¼(x;t) = U(¼;x;t) = u(¼;x) ¡ t ¢ c¼
U¹(x;t) = U(¹;x;t) = u(¹;x) ¡ t ¢ c¹; (11)
which formalizes that EP and CM suﬀer a ﬁxed utility cost of c¼ ¸ 0 and c¹ ¸ 0, respec-
tively, for any period of unsuccessful bargaining and delay. Immediate agreement on some
proposal x0 = x¤ which gives the responding player at least as much utility as rejection
and a counter-proposal x1 which would in equilibrium be accepted by the original proposer
(i.e. gives at least as much utility as rejection and a counter-proposal x2 which would
::: , etc.) is again an SPE outcome.25 The precise agreement, again assuming that CM
proposes ﬁrst, is found by solving the equations
x0 = v¼(x1)
x1 = v¹(x0); (12)
where vi(˜ x) denotes the from player j’s point of view best policy x whose implementation
in t = 0 (or, in general, period t) is weakly preferred by player i to implementation of ˜ x in
t = 1 (or, in general, period t+1). In a loose sense, vi(˜ x) is the present value to player i of
a refusal, and player j can obtain i’s consent only by oﬀering at least something as good as
vi(˜ x). Function vi(˜ x) takes into account player i’s individual rationality (e.g. EP will never
agree to any x > 2¼), and it may actually give more utility to player i than (x;t) = (˜ x;1)
would if that is in player j’s own interest. Functions v¼(x1) and v¹(x0) are illustrated in
Fig. 6 for the case of c¼ > c¹ and ¹ > 2¼.26 The ﬁgure covers all policies x in [0;1] rather
than only the Pareto-eﬃcient and individually rational ones in [¼;¹0], conﬁrming that the
latter restriction is without consequences. The unique intersection point corresponds to
the following solution to (12):
x¤
0(c¹;c¼) = ¹0 = 2¼
x¤
1(c¹;c¼) = ¹0 ¡ c¹:
Policy x¤
0(c¹;c¼) is the unique SPE outcome in case that CM proposes ﬁrst, and x¤
1(c¹;c¼)
would be the unique SPE outcome of the same game if EP were to propose ﬁrst.27 For
c¼ < c¹, the corresponding values are28
x¤
0(c¹;c¼) = ¼ + c¼
x¤
1(c¹;c¼) = ¼:
Hence the inﬁnite horizon alternating oﬀers bargaining game in which players experience a
constant cost for any period of delay, rather than discount utility, predicts that the player
25It is unique for c¼ 6= c¹.
26A similar picture could be used to graphically derive the SPE policy x¤(±¹;±¼) for above discounting
time preferences. v¼(x1) and v¹(x0) would have similar shapes but diﬀerent kinks and slopes. For example,
x0 = v¼(x1) would be deﬁned by the points (2¼;1), (2¼;2¼), (2¼¡±¼¼;¼), and (2¼;0) in x0-x1 coordinates.
27For ¹0 ¡c¹ < ¼, the outcome would be x¤
1(c¹;c¼) = ¼, i.e. EP as the initial proposer can – in view of
both players’ high costs of any delay – implement its ideal point despite greater bargaining costs.
28Analogous to above footnoote, x¤














Figure 6: Rubinstein bargaining with constant costs of delay c¼ and c¹
with lower costs of delay gets exactly or approximately his ideal point if costs of delay are
small. The intuition for this result is that both EP and CM correctly anticipate that the
player with smaller cost would win any ‘war of attrition’ started by a refusal of the initial
proposal.
Rubinstein bargaining with constant costs of delay is less commonly used in applications
compared to the discounting version not only because of this rather extreme29 prediction
and the lack of a close relationship with other bargaining models such as the Nash solution.
In addition, there is no unique SPE prediction for the focal case of both EP and CM
having identical costs of delay.30 Assuming that either EP or CM has smaller costs of
delay, the two will only by coincidence (e.g. for ¹ = 3¼) agree on a policy in the middle
of their respective ideal points. Also, there is slight status quo bias because the individual
rationality constraint of the player closer to q may bind, while that of his counterpart
cannot bind at least in the linear case. However, this is only an issue for particular ¼-¹-
combinations and if the player with greater status quo distance proposes ﬁrst.
29Note that the strong bias of above SPE towards the player with smaller costs of delay does not require
a big diﬀerence between c¹ and c¼, but holds for even the tiniest gap between them. This is one of the
reasons for using the term ‘extreme’.
30For c¼ = c¹, as can be easily checked with Fig. 6, there are inﬁnitely many solutions to (12) and
corresponding SPE. Some SPE involve ineﬃcient delay.
165 Bargaining between Boundedly Rational Agents
The basic alternating oﬀers model studied in Sect. 4 lends itself to a great multitude of
variations.31 These e.g. account for diﬀerent inside or outside options of the two players,
can incorporate chance moves that may unexpectedly terminate uncompleted negotiations,
or allow for the possibility that CM does not know EP’s valuation of policies and vice versa.
These models help to evaluate the strategic advantage or disadvantage caused by certain
characteristics of players (e.g. status quo distance, time or risk preference) and the assumed
bargaining procedure (e.g. a given time horizon, or sequence of oﬀers). All are based on
the central assumption that players are perfectly rational. It can be questioned – and
numerous laboratory experiments on strategic interaction between individuals emphasize
the relevance of this question – whether real human beings are actually capable of reasoning
their way through the (potentially inﬁnite) back and forth of oﬀers and counter-oﬀers which
underlay above analysis. Moreover, would they actually try to get the ‘best deal’ close to
their ideal point or possibly just want to meet a certain aspiration level or agree on a ‘fair
deal’?
There is ample experimental evidence that individuals are not only, and in many cases
not even primarily, interested in maximizing personal material gains. People satisﬁce,
have an aversion to inequity, and reciprocate friendly or unfriendly behavior – even un-
der conditions of anonymity and despite substantial temptations to free-ride or costs of
punishing uncooperative behavior (see e.g. Roth, 1995, Fehr and G¨ achter, 2002, and Fehr
and Schmidt, 2001). This suggests that simple Euclidean preferences are a much greater
abstraction than it appears. However, there is at least some evidence (see e.g. Bornstein
and Yaniv, 1998, and Kocher and Sutter, 2002) that other-regarding motives play a smaller
role in strategic interaction between groups of agents, who like the members of CM and
EP have to make intra-group decisions before they interact, than individuals.
Obvious bounds of human intelligence and rationality seem also less restrictive in our
context. Professional decision-makers in CM and EP establish common positions and
then seek mutually beneﬁcial compromises in often lengthy discussions of every pro and
con, aided by expert consultants. This is remote from a typical laboratory experiment in
which subjects face a stylized bargaining problem to be solved in minutes or an hour, with
monetary rewards in the order of 10–30 euro.32 Moreover, the conventional rationality
assumptions are suﬃcient for the conclusions reached above, but by no means necessary.
Simple-minded economic or political agents, who, for example, are ‘programmed’ to a par-
ticular strategy and replaced by others if they are too unsuccessful or who select strategies
by imitating successful peers, can end up with highly rational outcomes. They are in fact
likely to do so given enough time and a suﬃciently stable environment (cf. results on evo-
lutionary game theory and learning collected e.g. by Weibull, 1995, and Fudenberg and
31Many are collected in Muthoo (1999) and also Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
32This does not question the robustness of puzzling experimental ﬁndings themselves, such as rejections
of positive oﬀers in ultimatum games. Many experiments yield surprisingly similar results when carried
out in diﬀerent cultures, with diﬀerent time frames, diﬀerent levels of abstraction, and material rewards
ranging from nothing to more than a monthly income.
17Levine, 1998).
A number of bargaining models which suppose boundedly rational agents have been
investigated (see Napel, 2002, for an overview). They focus on feedback dynamics and
often the co-evolution of entire populations of agents. Agents are assumed to use rules
of thumb which are, at best, locally optimizing and involve only a heuristic exploitation
of available information. Young’s (1993) prominent model of adaptive play considers two
populations of agents, representatives of whom are randomly selected in each period to
play a simple bargaining game.33 Selected agents most of the time choose an optimal
reply to a sample of their counterparts’ m most recent strategy choices. The size of the
sample may diﬀer between both populations. Thus, players form diﬀerently informed
expectations about their counterpart’s strategy in the present period; they act myopically
in that they ignore any consequences of their behavior on the other population’s beliefs and
future choices. Occasionally (formalized by a probability " > 0), a selected agent chooses
completely at random from his entire set of available strategies.
A stochastic process is deﬁned by these repeated draws of agents and their myopic
interaction. The distribution over its states, deﬁned by both populations’ m most recent
strategy choices, converges to a stationary distribution that is independent of the initial
state. If agents sample no more than half of the last m available observations, all samples
have positive probability, and any strategy that constitutes a best reply to a given sample
has positive probability of being chosen as the respective agent’s myopic response to his
sample, this stationary distribution turns out to concentrate all weight on states which
correspond to the repeated implementation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as
" ! 0. Agents’ bargaining power is proportional to their population’s respective sample
size.
The relevance of Young’s results to modelling bargaining in the Conciliation Committee
lies in its further corroboration of the Nash bargaining solution: The agreement which
maximizes the product of two bargainers’ utility gains over the status quo is again singled
out – by a model remote from both Rubinstein’s perfectly rational bargainers who exactly
know each other’s preferences and Nash’s axioms. Young makes minimal assumptions on
the players’ information and rationality, and yet arrives at, roughly speaking, the same
conclusions as Nash and Rubinstein. Several other models that make similarly minimal
rationality assumptions and conﬁrm the predictions of high-rationality models have been
studied (cf. e.g. Binmore, Piccione, and Samuelson, 1998, or van Bragt, Gerding, and
La Poutr´ e, 2000).34 Their point is that one can have at least some conﬁdence that the
Nash-Rubinstein bargaining theory outlined in Sect. 3 and 4 captures essential features of
bargaining in a number of contexts.
33It is a version of the demand game: Both agents simultaneously demand shares of a surplus. If agents’
demands in sum amount to no more than the total surplus, both players receive their demands. If demands
are incompatible, both players receive nothing.
34Of course, there are also a number of models of boundedly rational bargaining which do not conﬁrm
SPE-predictions, especially for ultimatum games where experimental evidence has also not been very
supportive of them (see e.g. Roth and Erev, 1995, Slonim and Roth, 1998, and Napel, 2003).
186 Implications for Inter-institutional Power
One of the main reasons for caring about a reasonable model of decision-making in the
Conciliation Committee are the strategic repercussions that even the mere possibility of
invoking the Conciliation Committee has on the codecision procedure as a whole. Taking
these into account should yield better predictions of policy outcomes.35 Moreover, it allows
for a more accurate a priori evaluation of whether EP and CM are truly symmetric co-
decision-makers and of how successful diﬀerent players, referring to concerned institutions
as well as their individual members, will be on average given the decision procedure and
compared e.g. to possible amendments.
Average success, assessed by making reality-informed or normatively motivated distri-
butional assumptions about preferences and using above equilibrium predictions, is one
useful indicator of potential biases in codecision. It does in general, considering more than
two players, not reveal who is decisive or inﬂuential for realized policy outcomes, i.e. which
players are how powerful in deﬁning the results of EU codecision. This is because success
can be due to the power to shape a collective decision according to one’s individual prefer-
ences as well as the luck of ﬁnding oneself in agreement with a collective decision on which
one had marginal or no inﬂuence. Disentangling both is a main purpose of the theory of
power measurement.
A priori power in EU decision making has been analyzed by power indices deﬁned on
the domain of cooperative simple games in many studies (see e.g. Nurmi, 1998, ch. 7, or
Holler and Owen, 2001, for overviews). Simple games condense decision making into a 0-1-
framework, describing which coalitions can jointly produce a collective decision and which
cannot; there is no distinction between diﬀerent kinds of decisions. Simple games do not
account for any procedural details such as the distinction between a vote on a randomly
drawn proposal (if such a thing exists), a vote on the proposal of a given agenda-setter,
and the pursuit of a bilateral or multilateral agreement within a given bargaining protocol.
Modelling bargaining in the Conciliation Committee in that framework and assuming,
as above, that CM and EP act like unitary actors (whose respective yes-or-no decision
is possibly determined in a diﬀerent simple game reﬂecting the decision rule within CM
and EP, respectively), one obtains a unanimity game in which both players have equal
a priori power. This seems a reasonable assessment at ﬁrst sight, corresponding to the
qualitative conclusions of Crombez (2000) and Garrett and Tsebelis (2000). Quantitative
power analysis based on the explicit game-theoretic models studied above can, however,
lead to a very diﬀerent assessment, which to us is more convincing.
To move from Nash or Rubinstein predictions to a quantitative evaluation of the distri-
bution of a priori power in the Conciliation Committee, we apply the framework proposed
for power analysis by Napel and Widgr´ en (2002). It deﬁnes a player’s a priori power in a
given decision procedure and for a given probabilistic distribution of all relevant players’
preferences as the expected change to the equilibrium collective decision which would be
35This assumes knowledge about the preferences of the relevant players. See Napel and Widgr´ en (2003)
for a detailed analysis of the codecision procedure as a whole.
19brought about by a change in this player’s preferences.36 In a spatial voting context, this
links power to the question: Which impact would a marginal or ﬁxed-size shift of a given
player’s ideal policy point have on the collective decision? Note that a player can be pow-
erful in deﬁning the collective decision without being the one to beneﬁt the most from it.
This approach to power measurement via a sensitivity analysis of collective decisions gen-
eralizes the weighted counting of players’ pivot positions which is the basis of conventional
power indices.37
Assuming a unidimensional policy space X = [0;1] and linear spatial preferences, power
analysis of the Conciliation Committee amounts to an investigation of the change in the
equilibrium policy outcome eﬀected by a shift of ¼ or ¹ to the left or right. We consider
the eﬀect of marginal shifts of ideal points and hence look at the partial derivatives of the






¼ if q < ¼ · ¹ or ¹ < ¼ < q;
¹ if q < ¹ < ¼ or ¼ · ¹ < q;
q otherwise.
Hence the a posteriori power of EP for a given realization of status quo q and ideal points





1 if q < ¼ < ¹ or ¹ < ¼ < q;
0 otherwise. (13)
This formalizes that any (small) change of the player’s ideal point with smaller status quo
distance translates into a same-size shift of the agreed policy, provided there is agreement
about changing the status quo in at all.
A priori, the expected impact that any marginal shift of EP’s ideal policy ¼ would have
on the collective decision reached in the Conciliation Committee is therefore
»¼ = Pr(˜ q < ˜ ¼ < ˜ ¹) + Pr(˜ ¹ < ˜ ¼ < ˜ q);
where ˜ q, ˜ ¼, and ˜ ¹ denote the random variables corresponding to status quo and ideal points.
Not surprisingly, a priori power crucially depends on the distributional assumptions one
makes about EP’s and CM’s ideal points and the status quo. In the absence of any other





Pr(q < ˜ ¼ < ˜ ¹)dq +
Z 1
0
Pr(˜ ¹ < ˜ ¼ < q)dq
If ˜ ¼ and ˜ ¸ are uniformly distributed, too, this evaluates to »¼ = 1=3. This number can also
be directly deduced from the fact that there are six equally likely orderings of the three
36Alternatively, and more directly, one may work with probabilistic assumptions about players’ actions
rather than preferences which then induce actions.
37All established indices for simple games, such as the Banzhaf index or the Shapley-Shubik index, can be
obtained in this generalized framework by rather simple distribution assumptions and decision protocols.
See Napel and Widgr´ en (2002) for details.
20random variables ˜ q, ˜ ¼, and ˜ ¹, and that in two of them EP has power 1. In expectation, a
change of EP’s position on a given policy issue by one marginal unit results in a shift of the
collective decision by one third marginal unit. Analogously, one obtains »¹ = 1=3. So for
uniformly distributed ideal points of EP and CM, the equal-power indication based on a
simple game model is conﬁrmed. However, uniformity is no very convincing assumption at
the level of EP and CM because it neglects the diﬀerences in the internal decision making
of both institutions which are an important part of the codecision procedure and its ﬁnal
bargaining stage investigated here. They comprise very diﬀerent numbers of members and
apply diﬀerent majority rules to reach a decision or ﬁnd a common position.
To capture this, assume that individual members of EP and CM have random ideal
points ˜ ¼1;:::; ˜ ¼k and ˜ ¹1;:::; ˜ ¹m drawn independently from institution-speciﬁc symmetric
distributions F and G with k = 626 and m = 15. For simplicity, we ignore that the
15 members of CM have diﬀerent voting weight, i.e. assume simple voting in both EP
and CM.38 Any change to the status quo then needs at least p = 314 supporters in EP
and r = 11 supporters in CM, where the latter number approximates the 71% threshold
that exists for weighted voting in the real CM. For a policy x > q to the right of the
status quo, the 314-th ideal point counted from the right is the critical position in EP. If
the corresponding player prefers x to q, so will all 313 voters to his or her right and the
proposal is passed. If that player prefers q, so will all 312 voters to his or her left and the
proposal fails to get the required majority. Similarly, for a policy x < q the 314-th ideal
point counted from the left is crucial in EP. We therefore identify ˜ ¼ with the p-th smallest
value of ˜ ¼1;:::; ˜ ¼k, also called p-th order statistic ˜ ¼(p), when evaluating policies x < q, and
with the (k¡p+1)-th smallest value, i.e. order statistic ˜ ¼(k¡p+1), when evaluating policies
x > q. Similarly, CM’s random position ˜ ¹ is given by ˜ ¹(r) and ˜ ¹(m¡r+1) for x < q and
x > q, respectively.
Assuming that density functions f¢ exist for all these order statistics and denoting




Pr(q < ˜ ¼(k¡p+1) < ˜ ¹(m¡r+1))dq +
Z 1
0























[F˜ ¼(p)(q) ¡ F˜ ¼(p)(¹)]f˜ ¹(r)(¹)d¹dq:
One can exploit that for identical symmetric distributions of ˜ ¼1;:::; ˜ ¼k, the distribu-
tions of order statistics ˜ ¼(p) and ˜ ¼(k¡p+1) satisfy the following symmetry condition (see e.g.
38This assumption has only small eﬀect on inter-institutional power. Heterogenous weights make the
distribution of the pivotal ideal point more similar to the distribution of (large) individual players’ ideal
points. See the comments at the end of this section.
21Arnold et al., 1992, p. 26):
f˜ ¼(p)(x) = f˜ ¼(k¡p+1)(1 ¡ x) and F˜ ¼(p)(x) = 1 ¡ F˜ ¼(k¡p+1)(1 ¡ x): (14)























[F˜ ¼(p)(¯ q) ¡ F˜ ¼(p)(¯ ¹)]f˜ ¹(r)(¯ ¹)d¯ ¹d¯ q
where the second equality results from substitution (¯ ¹; ¯ q) ´ (1 ¡ ¹;1 ¡ q). Hence, given
symmetric distributions of ideal points, situations in which both EP and CM want to
change policy to the right or, respectively, the left of the status quo are symmetric, and
thus





[F˜ ¼(k¡p+1)(¹) ¡ F˜ ¼(k¡p+1)(q)]f˜ ¹(m¡r+1)(¹)d¹dq:
Now, it is to us a much more reasonable a priori assumption that individual decision
makers’ ideal points in both EP and CM come from a uniform distribution. Using analogue
reasoning for CM, we obtain39
»¼ = 0:061
»¹ = 0:557 (15)
These numbers do not only diverge signiﬁcantly from the value of 1=3 derived above, but
also indicate a much greater sensitivity of Conciliation Committee decisions to CM than
to EP. The reason is the following: First, EP’s simple majority rule together with its great
number of members implies that the random ideal point of its pivotal member, and hence
by our assumption EP’s ideal point ˜ ¼ in the Conciliation Committee, has a distribution
(conditioned on the status quo) which is highly concentrated around the mid-point of policy
space X.40 Second, CM’s qualiﬁed majority rule ensures that the distribution (conditioned
on the status quo) of the ideal point of its pivotal member – the 11-th most enthusiastic or
5-th least enthusiastic about changing the status quo in the considered direction – is more
spread out and, importantly, skewed with a peak rather close to the status quo.41 In other
39This uses a normal approximation of the (313,314)-Beta-distribution of EP’s median’s ideal point given
˜ q < ˜ ¼.
40Considering the case in which EP and CM prefer moving to the right of the status quo, E(˜ ¼(k¡p+1)) =
313=627 with a standard deviation of less than 0:02.
41Similarly, E(˜ ¹(m¡r+1)) = 5=16 with a standard deviation of more than 0:11.
22words, qualiﬁed majority implies a rather conservative position of CM in the Conciliation
Committee while EP is usually more progressive and centrally located. Status quo bias in
bargaining, established in Sect. 3 and 4, translates this into an inter-institutional bargaining
advantage for CM, which implies signiﬁcantly greater average inﬂuence and power for CM
in the Conciliation Committee.
Party memberships in EP should result in a positive correlation between many ideal
points ˜ ¼1;:::; ˜ ¼k, which will mitigate the centrality of ˜ ¼. Also, weighted voting in CM
somewhat reduces the skewness. In view of these two issues, »¼ and »¹ in (15) slightly
exaggerates the diﬀerence between EP’s and CM’s average inﬂuence in the Conciliation
Committee. Nevertheless, the diﬀerence is real and highly relevant. It is not identiﬁed by
any assessment based on simple game indices. It is revealed, though, by inter-institutional
power analysis based on explicit game-theoretic models such as those studied in Section 3
or 4.
7 Concluding Remarks
Most observers of European integration agree that EU decision making has developed
in the direction of a balanced bicameral system. The set of policy areas to which the
codecision procedure applies has been extended, making it the most important decision
making procedure of the EU. The procedure itself has been made more symmetric. This
paper has studied the ﬁnal stage of codecision, the Conciliation Committee. It is the key
forum in which European Parliament and Council of Ministers – aided by the supposedly
neutral Commission – are seeking legislative agreement.
The mostly qualitative assessments of who shapes the compromises reached by EP and
CM – and hence the distribution of power between these two players – by diﬀerent authors
diverge. Some scholars have argued that the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers act as equally inﬂuential co-legislators already, while others deduce asymmetry.
The divergent assessments are mostly due to diﬀerences in modelling, in particular of
agenda-setting. Steunenberg and Dimitrova (1999) and Crombez (2000) assume that one
player acts as the agenda setter and thus supposedly has the capacity to irrevocably commit
to a take-it-or-leave-it policy proposal. The latter presumption is very questionable. Also,
there is no agreement between them whether EP or CM has the initiative. Fortunately,
this does not matter much if EP and CM can engage in multiple rounds of bargaining and
are not too impatient.
To us, the Amsterdam version of codecision gives neither EP nor CM a signiﬁcant
direct procedural advantage. In this respect we side with Tsebelis and Garrett’s (2000)
assessment. However, in this paper we have argued that the apparent symmetry between
Parliament and Council as co-legislating institutions does not imply they are equal partners
or equally powerful. This is a non-trivial consequence of the fact that these institutions
use distinct internal decision mechanisms – in particular diﬀerent majority thresholds –
which provide an indirect procedural (dis-)advantage. Section 6 has discussed this issue
in detail, based on our earlier deduction of status quo bias in Conciliation Committee de-
23cisions from standard bargaining models. While both institutions are formally symmetric
in the Conciliation Committee, diﬀerent majority thresholds imply diﬀerent (average) bar-
gaining positions. This creates a signiﬁcant asymmetry in the Conciliation Committee –
with greater inﬂuence for the on average more conservative Council of Ministers (referring
to smaller interest in amending the status quo). The gradual shift towards bicameral-
ism observed in the past is therefore ‘incomplete’ even in those policy domains to which
the codecision procedure applies if ‘co-decisions’ should eventually be equally sensitive to
preferences of Parliament and Council.
Our arguments are based on very standard spatial voting assumptions and bargaining
theory. We made several simpliﬁcations that should be relaxed in future research. For
example, we did not explicitly analyze the eﬀect of weighted voting in the Council. Also,
we considered one isolated instance of bargaining between players who suﬀered exactly the
same disutility from distance to their respective ideal point. Thus, repeated-game eﬀects
(typically allowing for a great multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes) and log-rolling based
on player-speciﬁc utility and / or diﬀerent distance functions (weighting policy dimensions
by subjective measures of salience), were not dealt with. These shortcomings should not be
over-estimated, though: True log-rolling complicates the derivation of the contract curve
considerably, but the essential bargaining problem of selecting among many Pareto-eﬃcient
alternatives (with diﬀerent distributional consequences) remains the same. Also, regular
national and European elections seem to limit the scope for sophisticated repeated-game
strategies of EP and CM as such. More controversial is the assumption that Council and
Parliament behave like unilateral actors in their negotiations – which is unfortunately very
standard, too. This restricts both institutions to exhibit a high level of collective rationality
and precludes strategic alliances among individual members of EP and CM.
Appendix
Proposition 1
Assume that preferences of EP and CM are represented by utility functions ui(x) ´
u(d(¸i;x)) which are strictly decreasing and weakly concave in d(¸i;x) and yield a Pareto
frontier described by a function Á: u¼(x) 7! maxfu¹(y): y 2 X ^ u¼(y) = u¼(x)g which
is diﬀerentiable on the interior of the contract curve. Then the symmetric Nash bargain
x¤(¼;¹) ´ x¤ between EP and CM is closer to the ideal point which is closer to the status
quo, i.e.
d(¼;0) < d(¹;0) () d(¼;x
¤) < d(¹;x
¤);
whenever there are gains from trade.
Proof. Utility is the same concave strictly decreasing function of the distance to the





Moreover, the Pareto frontier must be symmetric, i.e. Á(Á(u¼)) = Á(u¹) = u¼ which implies
Á
0(Á(u¼)) ¢ Á
0(u¼) = 1 and, in particular,
Á
0(˜ u¼) = ¡1 (16)
24for ﬁxed point ˜ u¼ = Á(˜ u¼) (using Á
0(u¼) < 0). Concavity of utility function u(¢) translates




¸ ¡1; u¼ < ˜ u¼;
· ¡1; u¼ > ˜ u¼: (17)
W.l.o.g. let ui(¸i) = 0 and assume uq
¼ > uq
¹.
First, consider the case that u¼(¹) < uq
¼, i.e. CM’s ideal point leaves EP worse oﬀ than
the status quo. The end point of the contract curve preferred by CM then gives exactly
utility u¼ = uq
¼ to EP, implying that the Nash product N(u¼;u¹) ´ (u¼ ¡ uq
¼)(u¹ ¡ uq
¹)
is zero. Since it is positive in the interior of the contract curve, this cannot be the Nash
bargaining outcome.
Second, consider the case that u¼(¹) ¸ uq
¼, i.e. CM’s ideal point leaves EP weakly
better oﬀ than the status quo. CM’s preferred end point of the contract curve in this case
is ¹ and yields utility Á(¹) < 0 to EP and 0 to CM. We show that this is no solution either:
The change in the Nash product N(u¼;u¹) implied by moving slightly from ¹ towards ¼ is
captured by its directional derivative at (Á(0);0) along the Pareto frontier, i.e. in direction




























From ˜ u¼ < 0 follows ˜ u¼ > Á(0), so (17) implies 0 ¸ Á
0(Á(0))) ¸ ¡1. Therefore, given
uq
¹ < uq
¼ < 0, the ﬁrst summand is strictly positive. Both Á(0) and Á
0(Á(0)) are negative,
so the second summand is positive, too. Therefore, N0
a(Á(0);0) > 0 and (Á(0);0) cannot
maximize N(¢).
It follows that EP and CM must either agree on ¼, in which case u¤
¼ > u¤
¹ is obvious,
or on some point in the interior of the contract curve which is characterized by tangency
of an iso-N(¢) line and Á(¢) in (u¤
¼;u¤





































¼ · ˜ u¼, which implies Á






¹ and supposing u¤
¼ > u¤
¹ a contradiction can be shown (for
any interior solution g0(u¤
¼) > ¡1, while (17) implies Á
0)u¤
¼) · ¡1). This establishes the
proposition.
25Proposition 2
Proof. The proof is by complete induction. First, note that the claim is true for n = 1




















t ¢ (2¼ ¡ ±¼¼ ¡ ¹
0) = 2¼ ¡ ±¼¼;
in line with above analysis of these cases.
Second, period 2 of the alternating oﬀers bargaining game with n + 2 periods (also
starting with CM’s proposal) is strategically equivalent to period 0 of the game with n
periods, where in equilibrium x¤(n;±¹;±¼) will be oﬀered by CM and accepted by EP by
the induction hypothesis. So in period 1 of the n+2-period game, EP optimally proposes
x1 = ±¹ ¢ x¤(n;±¹;±¼), making it weakly preferable for CM to accept and obtain (un-
discounted) utility ¼ ¡ j¼ ¡ ±¹x¤(n;±¹;±¼)j = 2¼ ¡ ±¹x¤(n;±¹;±¼) in period 1. In fact,
(±¹ ¢ x¤(n;±¹;±¼);1) is the unique SPE outcome of the subgame of this n + 2-period game
starting with EP’s proposal in period 1. Reasoning backwards from this, it is optimal for
CM to propose x¤ with
x
¤ = 2¼ ¡ ±¼ (2¼ ¡ ±¹x
¤(n;±¹;±¼))
in period 0, and for EP to accept – corresponding to the unique SPE outcome (x¤;0).
Using (8), one can check that
x












t ¢ (2¼ ¡ ±¼¼ ¡ ¹





















































Thus, since the claim is true for n = 1 and n = 2, it must be true for all n ¸ 1.
References
Bade, S. (2002), Multidimensional Voting under Uncertainty, New York University, mimeo.
26Binmore, K. G. (1987), Nash bargaining theory II, In K. G. Binmore and P. Dasgupta
(Eds.), The Economics of Bargaining, pp. 61–76, Oxford.
Binmore, K.G., M. Piccione, and L. Samuelson (1998), Evolutionary stability in alternating-
oﬀers bargaining games, Journal of Economic Theory 80, pp. 257–291.
Bornstein, G., and Yaniv, I. (1998), Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game:
Are groups more rational players? Experimental Economics 1, pp. 101-8
Chae, S., and P. Heidhues (2002), Bargaining between groups, WZB Discussion Paper,
Berlin.
Crombez, C. (1997), The codecision procedure of the European Union, Legislative Studies
Quarterly 22, 97-119.
Crombez (2000), The institutional reform and codecision in the European Union, Consti-
tutional Political Economy 11, 41-57.
Crombez, C., Steunenberg, B. and Corbett, R. (2000), Understanding the EU legislative
process: political scientists and practitioners’ perspectives, European Union Politics 1,
363-381.
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1881), Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathe-
matics to the Moral Sciences, Reprinted by A. M. Kelley, New York, 1961.
Fehr, E., and S. G¨ achter (2002), Altruistic Punishment in Humans, Nature 415 (January
10), pp. 137–140.
Fehr, E., and K. Schmidt (2001), Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and
Economic Applications, forthcoming in M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and St. Turnovsky
(eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics - 8th World Congress, Econometric
Society Monographs.
Fudenberg, D., and D.K. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Gale, J., K. G. Binmore, and L. Samuelson (1995), Learning to be imperfect: The ultima-
tum game, Games and Economic Behavior 8, pp. 56–90.
Garrett, G. (1995), From the Luxembourg compromise to codecision: decision making in
the European Union, Electoral Studies 50, 269-299.
Garrett, G., Tsebelis, G. and Corbett, R. (2001), The EU legislative process: academics
vs. pratitioners - round 2, European Union Politics 2, 353-366.
Van Bragt, D. D. B., E. H. Gerding, and J. A. La Poutr´ e (2000), Equilibrium selection in
alternating-oﬀers bargaining models – The evolutionary computing approach. Report
SEN-R0013, Stichting Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam.
G¨ uth, W. (1995), On ultimatum bargaining experiments – A personal review, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 27, pp. 329–344.
27Harsanyi, J.C. (1956), Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory
of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s Theories, Econometrica
24, pp. 144–157.
Holler, M.J., and G. Owen (2001), Power Indices and Coalition Formation, Dordrecht:
Kluwer.
Kalai, E. (1977), Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining,
International Journal of Game Theory 6, pp. 129–133.
Kocher, M. G. and Sutter, M. (2002), The decision maker matters. Individual versus
team behavior in experimental beauty-contest games. Institute of Public Economics.
Discussion Paper 2000/4. University of Innsbruck; revised version January 2002.
Muthoo, A. (1999), Bargaining Theory with Applications, Cambridge.
Napel, S. (2002), Bilateral Bargaining: Theory and Applications, Lecture Notes in Eco-
nomics and Mathematical Systems 518, Heidelberg.
Napel, S. (2003), Aspiration Adaptation in the Ultimatum Minigame, Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 43, pp. 86–106.
Napel, S., and M. Widgr´ en (2002), Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis – A Uniﬁed
Approach, University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Working Paper
No. 345.
Napel, S., and M. Widgr´ en (2003), Strategic power in EU codecision, mimeo.
Nash, J. F. (1950), The bargaining problem, Econometrica 18, pp. 155–162.
Nash, J. F. (1953), Two-person cooperative bargaining games, Econometrica 21, pp. 128–
140.
Nurmi, H. (1998), Rational Behaviour and Design of Institutions, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1990),Bargaining and Markets, San Diego, CA.
Roth, A. E. (1995), Bargaining experiments, In J. Kagel and A. E. Roth (Eds.), Handbook
of Experimental Economics, Chapter 4, pp. 253–348, Princeton, NJ.
Roth, A.E., and I. Erev (1995), Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data
and Simple Dynamic Models of the Intermediate Term, Games and Economic Behavior
8, pp. 164–212.
Rusinowska, A. (2002), On certain generalization of Rubinstein’s bargaining model, In:
L.A. Petrosjan and V.V. Mazalov (eds.), Game Theory and Applications, Vol. 8, Haup-
pauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Rubinstein, A. (1982), Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica 50, pp. 97–
109.
Slonim, R. and Roth, A.E. (1998), Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Exper-
iment in the Slovak Republic, Econometrica 66, pp. 569–596.
28Steunenberg, B. (1994). Decision-Making under Diﬀerent Institutional Arrangements:
Legislation by the European Community, Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Eco-
nomics 150: 642–669.
Steunenberg, B., and Dimitrova (1999), Interests, Legitimacy and Constitutional Choice:
the Extension of the Codecision Procedure in Amsterdam, University of Twente, mimeo.
Steunenberg, B., and T. Selck (2002), The insigniﬁcance of the signiﬁcance? A review of
procedural models on EU decision making, University of Leiden, mimeo.
Steunenberg, B., Schmidtchen, D. and Koboldt, C. (1999), Strategic Power in the European
Union: Evaluating the Distribution of Power in Policy Games, Journal of Theoretical
Politics 11: 339–366.
Tsebelis, G., and Garrett, G. (2000), Legislative politics in the European Union, European
Union Politics 1, 5-32.
Tsebelis, G., and Money (1997), Bicameralism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Weibull, J.W. (1995), Evolutionary Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Young, H. P. (1993), An evolutionary model of bargaining, Journal of Economic Theory 59,
pp. 145–168.
29CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
________________________________________________________________________
963  Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Bjørn Volkerink, How to Measure the Tax
Burden on Labour at the Macro-Level?, June 2003
964  Harry Grubert, The Tax Burden on Cross-Border Investment: Company Strategies and
Country Responses, June 2003
965  Kirk A. Collins and James B. Davies, Measuring Effective Tax Rates on Human
Capital: Methodology and an Application to Canada, June 2003
966  W. Steven Clark, Using Micro-Data to Assess Average Tax Rates, June 2003
967  Christopher Heady, The ‘Taxing Wages’ Approach to Measuring the Tax Burden on
Labour, June 2003
968  Michael P. Devereux and Alexander Klemm, Measuring Taxes on Income from Capital:
Evidence from the UK, June 2003
969  Bernhard Eckwert and Itzhak Zilcha, The Effect of Better Information on Income
Inequality, June 2003
970  Hartmut Egger and Josef Falkinger, The Role of Public Infrastructure for Firm Location
and International Outsourcing, June 2003
971  Dag Morten Dalen and Trond E. Olsen, Regulatory Competition and Multi-national
Banking, June 2003
972  Matthias Wrede, Tax Deductibility of Commuting Expenses and Residential Land Use
with more than one Center, June 2003
973  Alessandro Cigno and Annalisa Luporini, Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing
Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard, June 2003
974  Chang Woon Nam, Andrea Gebauer and Rüdiger Parsche, Is the Completion of EU
Single Market Hindered by VAT Evasion?, June 2003
975  Michael Braulke and Giacomo Corneo, Capital Taxation May Survive in Open
Economies, July 2003
976  Assar Lindbeck, An Essay on Welfare State Dynamics, July 2003
977  Henrik Jordahl and Luca Micheletto, Optimal Utilitarian Taxation and Horizontal
Equity, July 2003978  Martin D. D. Evans and Richard K. Lyons, Are Different-Currency Assets Imperfect
Substitutes?, July 2003
979  Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann and Frank Stähler, Market Entry Regulation and
International Competition, July 2003
980  Vivek Ghosal, Firm and Establishment Volatility: The Role of Sunk Costs, Profit
Uncertainty and Technological Change, July 2003
981  Christopher A. Pissarides, Unemployment in Britain: A European Success Story, July
2003
982  Wolfgang Buchholz, Richard Cornes, and Wolfgang Peters, On the Frequency of
Interior Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy, July 2003
983  Syed M. Ahsan and Panagiotis Tsigaris, Choice of Tax Base Revisited: Cash Flow vs.
Prepayment Approaches to Consumption Taxation, July 2003
984  Campbell Leith and Jim Malley, A Sectoral Analysis of Price-Setting Behavior in US
Manufacturing Industries, July 2003
985  Hyun Park and Apostolis Philippopoulos, Choosing Club Membership under Tax
Competition and Free Riding, July 2003
986  Federico Etro, Globalization and Political Geography, July 2003
987  Dan Ariely, Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth, An Experimental Analysis of Ending
Rules in Internet Auctions, July 2003
988  Paola Conconi and Carlo Perroni, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and
Domestic Policy Credibility, July 2003
989  Charles B. Blankart and Christian Kirchner, The Deadlock of the EU Budget: An
Economic Analysis of Ways In and Ways Out, July 2003
990  M. Hasham Pesaran and Allan Timmermann, Small Sample Properties of Forecasts
from Autoregressive Models under Structural Breaks, July 2003
991  Hyun Park, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Vangelis Vassilatos, On the Optimal Size of
Public Sector under Rent-Seeking competition from State Coffers, July 2003
992  Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth, Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet
Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction, July
2003
993  Pierre Salmon, The Assignment of Powers in an Open-ended European Union, July
2003
994  Louis N. Christofides and Chen Peng, Contract Duration and Indexation in a Period of
Real and Nominal Uncertainty, July 2003995  M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann, Björn-Jakob Treutler, and Scott M. Weiner,
Macroeconomic Dynamics and Credit Risk: A Global Perspective, July 2003
996  Massimo Bordignon and Sandro Brusco, On Enhanced Cooperation, July 2003
997  David F. Bradford, Addressing the Transfer-Pricing Problem in an Origin-Basis X Tax,
July 2003
998  Daniel Gros, Who Needs Foreign Banks?, July 2003
999  Wolfram Merzyn and Heinrich W. Ursprung, Voter Support for Privatizing Education:
Evidence on Self-Interest and Ideology, July 2003
1000 Jo Thori Lind, Fractionalization and the Size of Government, July 2003
1001 Daniel Friedman and Donald Wittman, Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-
Sided Incomplete Information, July 2003
1002 Matthew Clarke and Sardar M. N. Islam, Health Adjusted GDP (HAGDP) Measures of
the Relationship Between Economic Growth, Health Outcomes and Social Welfare, July
2003
1003 Volker Grossmann, Contest for Attention in a Quality-Ladder Model of Endogenous
Growth, August 2003
1004 Marcel Gérard and Joan Martens Weiner, Cross-Border Loss Offset and Formulary
Apportionment: How do they affect multijurisdictional firm investment spending and
interjurisdictional tax competition ?, August 2003
1005 Burkhard Heer, Nonsuperneutrality of Money in the Sidrauski Model with Heterogeous
Agents, August 2003
1006 V. Anton Muscatelli, Piergiovanna Natale, and Patrizio Tirelli, A Simple and Flexible
Alternative to the Stability and Growth Pact Deficit Ceilings. Is it at hand?, August
2003
1007 Reto Foellmi and Josef Zweimüller, Inequality and Economic Growth: European Versus
U.S. Experiences, August 2003
1008 James S. Costain and Michael Reiter, Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and
the Calibration of Matching Models, August 2003
1009 Marco Runkel, Optimal Contest Design when the Designer’s Payoff Depends on
Competitive Balance, August 2003
1010 Donald O. Parsons, Torben Tranaes and Helene Bie Lilleør, Voluntary Public
Unemployment Insurance, August 2003
1011 Rüdiger Pethig and Andreas Wagener, Profit Tax Competition and Formula
Apportionment, August 20031012 Johan Willner, Privatisation and Public Ownership in Finland, August 2003
1013 Seppo Kari and Jouko Ylä-Liedenpohja, Taxation and Valuation of International Real
Investments, August 2003
1014 James Heckman, Rosa Matzkin and Lars Nesheim, Simulation and Estimation of
Hedonic Models, August 2003
1015 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Towards a Macro-Prudential Leading Indicators Framework
for Monitoring Financial Vulnerability, August 2003
1016 J. Stephen Ferris and Stanley L. Winer, Searching for Keynes: With Application to
Canada, 1870-2000, August 2003
1017 Massimo Bordignon, Luca Colombo and Umberto Galmarini, Fiscal Federalism and
Endogenous Lobbies’ Formation, August 2003
1018 Annette Alstadsæter, The Dual Income Tax and Firms’Income Shifting through the
Choice of Organizational Form and Real Capital Investments, August 2003
1019 Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Holmlund, Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:
Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?, August 2003
1020 Kashif S. Mansori, Following in their Footsteps: Comparing Interest Parity Conditions
in Central European Economies to the Euro Countries, August 2003
1021 Christoph Borgmann and Matthias Heidler, Demographics and Volatile Social Security
Wealth: Political Risks of Benefit Rule Changes in Germany, August 2003
1022 Kjell Erik Lommerud, Bjørn Sandvik and Odd Rune Staume, Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and
Redistribution, August 2003
1023 Patrick Karl O’Brien, The Governance of Globalization: The Political Economy of
Anglo-American Hegemony, 1793-2003, September 2003
1024 Antonio Ciccone and Giovanni Peri, Skills’ Substitutability and Technological Progress:
U.S. States 1950-1990, September 2003
1025 Bjørn Sandvik, Optimal Taxation and Normalisations, September 2003
1026 Massimo Bordignon and Gilberto Turati, Bailing Out Expectations and Health
Expenditure in Italy, September 2003
1027 José A. Herce, Namkee Ahn, Ricard Génova, and Joaquín Pereira, Bio-Demographic
and Health Aspects of Ageing in the EU, September 2003
1028 John Komlos and Marieluise Baur, From the Tallest to (One of) the Fattest: The
Enigmatic Fate of the American Population in the 20
th Century, September 2003
1029 Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén, Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU’s
Conciliation Committee, September 2003